Rising Pressure and Offensive Decline in the NFL

Turn on any NFL talk show and you’ll hear some version of the same conversation: passing offense is down and it’s largely because of two-high safety looks. Mel Kiper even called for two-high safeties to be outlawed! But is this really the whole story? Surely not, as two-high coverage has existed for a long time and we’re not seeing a clear and obvious pattern of increased two-high usage in the FTN charting data (we will revisit this question in Week 6 with a larger sample size). So what else is going on?

While two-high coverage rates don’t (yet) show a clear pattern that could explain the decreased passing production, there are three data points that do:

• The average depth of target has dropped significantly
• Pressure rates/sack rates are up
• Quarterback performance against the blitz has declined significantly

These three patterns are connected, and are likely exaggerating the effects of one another.

Average Depth of Target Has Dropped

Average depth of target is an interesting data point because it seemingly is a perfect fit under the analysis that two-high coverage is driving the change in offensive production. If defenses are taking away deep passes, then the average depth of target will go down. Duh! And we certainly see that occurring:

The drop-off so far in 2024 has been staggering. But again, what if something else is driving this change even more than coverage shells? Something like a need to get rid of the ball quickly.

Pressure Rates and Sack Rates Are Up

Quarterbacks have been pressured on 30.1% of dropbacks this season, up from 28.5% in 2023 and 26.8% in 2022. The sack rate trend is even more pronounced:

Meanwhile, defenses are creating pressure faster than ever before (in the FTN charting era, at least). For example, Pittsburgh led the NFL a year ago in average time to pressure, getting to the quarterback in an average of 2.1 seconds. They were one of just two teams under 2.3 seconds. This season, four teams are at 2.0 seconds or below and twelve are under 2.3 seconds. Small sample variance? Possibly, but the median has also dropped from 2.5 seconds to 2.4 seconds. So how the heck might we explain this trend?

To me, it starts with personnel. The defensive players making the big bucks these days are the ones who can rush the passer, not stop the run. Each year, there are fewer run-stopping specialists playing on early downs on the defensive line, replaced by smaller and faster men who can get to the quarterback. Adam Harstad has even argued, rather convincingly, that age and learning curves at various positions lead to an advantage for aging pass rushers over younger offensive linemen (my beloved Brandon Graham is a prime example) more so than at any other position.

Lastly, this could also be a quarterback issue. Or even simply a change is what’s desirable for quarterbacks. The ability to extend plays by escaping the pocket with speed and agility has never been more sought out – a list of the game’s best quarterbacks includes:

• Patrick Mahomes
• Josh Allen
• Lamar Jackson
• Jalen Hurts
• Kyler Murray

That doesn’t even mention the youth movement of Anthony Richardson, Jayden Daniels, and Caleb Williams among plenty of others. With few exceptions (Josh Allen and Patrick Mahomes), this archetype of quarterback tends to take more sacks because they have the added option of extending plays when pressured (which doesn’t always succeed). Consequently, when these guys do need to get the ball out early, the coaches are forced to scheme the ball out quickly with various screen-type passes, all of which lower the average depth of target. But quarterback play is also responsible for the offensive decline in one other way – performance against the blitz.

Quarterbacks Are Failing Against the Blitz

In 2022, I wrote about how when defenses blitz, they open themselves up to chunk plays. How quarterbacks like Joe Burrow put defenses in lose-lose situations by dominating the blitz, but also succeeding at such a high rate with a clean pocket. Quarterbacks aren’t penalizing teams for blitzing anymore:

Fewer yards per attempt, lower adjusted completion percentages, and dramatically lower success rates. I’m hesitant to blame quarterbacks for this trend. Take Jalen Hurts, for example. His 2 DYAR and -11.2% DVOA were both 10th worst among QBs in 2023 against the blitz. In comes Kellen Moore with a new scheme and some actual answers to extra rushers, and now Jalen Hurts has already posted 104 DYAR in three weeks against the blitz, with a 92.6% DVOA. In fact, there’s an incredible correlation between the best offenses and their performance specifically against the blitz, even though the average team is only attempting around eight passes per game against extra rushers:

The top 10 against the blitz account for four of the top five offenses, six of the top 10, and only one of the bottom 10. If you can succeed against the blitz, you can succeed in this new NFL landscape. To this point, the resurgence of offense is likely to come only when offensive coordinators make the adjustment and start punishing defenses for their personnel and schematic decisions.

Final Thoughts

These patterns are, of course, related to one another. Protections are failing, especially when extra rushers come, which means offensive coordinators have to call plays that get the ball out of the quarterback’s hands quickly – lowering the average depth of target. The scariest fact of all for offense may be that defenses aren’t yet blitzing more in 2024 than they have in the past few years. If they do, offense is likely to get even worse long before it gets better.